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The Canadian Middle Road: Balancing




When the European Commission (Commission) announced
its decision to block General Electric's (GE) acquisition of Hon-
eywell International Inc. (Honeywell), accusations of protection-
ism flew from politicians and the popular press.' Senator Jay
Rockefeller, chair of the Senate aviation subcommittee, indi-
cated that the European Union (EU)2 could face trade retalia-
tions for its actions.3 Others, especially business leaders, la-
mented that the European and U.S. approaches to merger
control were hopelessly irreconcilable.4 They feared that the di-
verging views of the United States and EU would impose exorbi-
tant costs on corporations by forcing them to comply with two
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. magna cum
laude, 1999, St. Olaf College; Fulbright Scholar, 1999-2000, University of Oslo;
Clerk to the Honorable Helen Meyer, Minnesota Supreme Court, 2003-2004 Term.
The author would like to dedicate this article to his parents, Herb and Nancy Marth,
and to his grandmother, Dorothy Dorr.
1. See Editorial, Europe to GE: Go Home, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2001, at A14;
Andrew Hill & Kevin Done, Going Home, Alone, FIN. TIMES, June 18, 2001, at 18;
Merger Muddle: Transatlantic Antitrust Troubles: The EU is Entitled to Veto the
GE /Honeywell Merger - But its Procedures Need Improvement, ECONOMIST, June 23,
2001, at 11; Brandon Mitchener & Matt Murray, EU's Monti Stands Firm on GE
Deal: Commissioner Rejects Claims that Review Was Politically Tainted, WALL ST.
J., June 27, 2001, at A8.
2. Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, this Note refers
to the political unit of the European Member states as the European Union and re-
fers to the law governing economic relations within the EU as European Community
(EC) law.
3. Mitchener & Murray, supra note 1.
4. Brian M. Carney, Blame the EU's Antitrust Rules-Not Monti, WALL ST. J.,
July 6, 2001, at A8; Anita Raghaven & Bob Davis, Uncle Sam and Mr. Monti: Tale of
Two Trustbusters, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2001, at All; Trans-Atlantic Differences
Hurt GE Deal, O'Neil Says, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2001, at A2.
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distinct sets of competition regulations.5
Contrary to the views of these skeptics, however, U.S. and
European Community (EC)6 merger regulations are converging
in substance.7 Transatlantic treaties and increased contacts be-
tween competition officials in the United States and the EU
have led their respective agencies to agree on methods of ana-
lyzing particular mergers. This consensus among enforcement
officials on methods of analysis has fostered agreement on the
results of most investigations.8 Officials from the Directorate
General for Competition (DG-IV), the antitrust arm of the
Commission, consult regularly with their counterparts at the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice
(DOJ).9 These agencies entered into two bilateral antitrust en-
forcement agreements in the 1990's, covering the extraterrito-
rial reach of each jurisdiction's competition laws and the inves-
tigative techniques employed by their enforcement agencies.' °
The few differences in policy that remain reflect the different
historical backgrounds of the two competition regimes rather




This Note will focus on those instances when the enforce-
ment bodies have disagreed and will suggest reforms in the
Commission's merger review procedure that will decrease the
likelihood of discord in future transactions. Part I will present
the history that forms the basis of current European and U.S.
5. See Brandon Mitchener, Can Globalization Include Regulators?, WALL ST.
J., June 25, 2001, at A12.
6. See supra note 2 for an explanation of the Note's use of EC and EU.
7. See Thomas E. Kauper, Merger Control in the United States and the Euro-
pean Union: Some Observations, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 305, 312-13 (2000).
8. See Debra A. Valentine, Jurisdiction and Enforcement: Building a Coopera-
tive Framework for Oversight in Mergers-The Answer to Extraterritorial Issues in
Merger Review, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 525, 530-31 (1998); John R. Wilke, US Anti-
trust Chief Criticizes EU Decision to Reject Merger of GE and Honeywell, WALL ST.
J., July 5, 2001, at A3 (quoting Charles James, head of the DOJ's Antitrust Division
that "there were extensive consultations in the matter throughout the entire process
[of investigating the GE-Honeywell merger]").
9. Valentine, supra note 8, at 530-31.
10. The United States and the EU entered into an agreement in 1991 which
aided each agency in procuring information from its transatlantic partner and clari-
fied notions of positive comity between the two jurisdictions. Agreement on the Ap-
plication of their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-EC, 30 I.L.M. 1487. This
treaty was amended and strengthened to its current form in 1997. Agreement be-
tween the Government of the United States of America and the European Communi-
ties on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their
Competition Laws, June 4, 1998, U.S.-EC, 37 I.L.M. 1070.
11. See Kauper, supra note 7, at 310-13.
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antitrust regulations. Part II will contrast the U.S. analysis of
merger review with the Commission's and explain how the two
frameworks have generally led to similar results. This section
will argue that the Commission's theories predict competitive
harm that will not materialize in the short run and are there-
fore too speculative to form the basis for blocking proposed
mergers. After presenting some of the reforms that commenta-
tors have suggested, Part III will suggest that the adoption of a
Canadian-style post-merger review would allow the Commission
to address antitrust concerns without restraining global effi-
ciency and would also bring EU analysis more in line with U.S.
analysis. Throughout the analysis, the Note will emphasize the
goals of efficiency maximization and protection of the Commis-
sion's right to safeguard its own consumers.
I. THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
MERGER ENFORCEMENT
When the Commission vetoed the GE-Honeywell deal, the
judgment spawned a rash of criticism that merger review by
multiple jurisdictions was costly to multinational business
transactions.1 2 The business community was mainly concerned
with the heavy costs of compliance with the regulations of nu-
merous countries." Jack Welch, GE's high-profile CEO, ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the U.S. clearance his
company secured for the acquisition was meaningless in the face
of the Commission's action. 4 The concerns of Mr. Welch and the
parties to this transaction reflect the worries of many: that mul-
tijurisdictional scrutiny of mergers imposes excessive costs on
business. 5 These excessive costs take the form of high compli-
ance costs and uncertainty. 6
Ideally, merging multinational companies should be forced
to submit to review before only one body. This would reduce the
12. See Europe to GE: Go Home, supra note 1; George Mellon, GE-Honeywell
Exposes Flaws in Antitrust Policy: Global View, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2001, at A23.
13. See William J. Kolasky & Leon B. Greenfield, A View to Kill: The Lost
GE/Honeywell Deal Reveals a Trans-Atlantic Clash of Essentials, LEGAL TIMES,
July 30, 2001, at 28-29; Mitchener, supra note 5, at A12.
14. Mellon, supra note 12; Deborah Hargreaves & Peter Spiegel, Oceans Apart
on Competition Policy: Brussels' Objections to the GE-Honeywell Deal Have Done Lit-
tle to Ease US-EU Relations, FIN. TIMES, June 15, 2001, at 17.
15. See Eleanor M. Fox, Harmonization of Law and Procedures in a Globalized
World: Why, What and How?, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 593, 594 (1991).
16. See id.
20031
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costs inherent in filing for approval, producing the necessary
documents, and maintaining contact with regulators, which
would result in savings for consumers. 17 The potential efficien-
cies that lie within an integrated system of merger review has
prompted business leaders to lobby government officials in vari-
ous jurisdictions for increased cooperation in the area of anti-
trust enforcement. 8 Antitrust scholars generally agree that
mergers that increase such "productive efficiency "1 9 should be
encouraged because such efficiencies increase "allocative effi-
ciency,"2 ° thereby distributing greater resources and wealth to
consumers.
Greater convergence among national antitrust policies
would also increase certainty in international business transac-
21tions.' While companies undoubtedly prefer lenient standards,
their primary concern is that regulations be applied in a pre-
dictable fashion.22 If firms know how antitrust regulators will
react to a particular transaction, they will be able to internalize
the costs associated with merger analysis into their business de-
cisions. 23 Accordingly, predictability encourages firms to enter
into decisions that they otherwise would not have attempted,
due to high regulatory costs.
24
17. See Mellon, supra note 12.
18. See Mitchener, supra note 5.
19. Productive efficiency refers to the effective use of resources by firms.
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 91 (1978). 'Economies of scale such as
specialization of function, ability to obtain capital, [and] management skill" are some
factors that influence productive efficiency. Id. at 105.
20. Allocative efficiency is attained when resources are placed where consum-
ers value them most. Id. at 91.
21. Kolasky & Greenfield, supra note 13, at 29; Calvin S. Goldman & John D.
Bodrug, The Merger Review Process: The Canadian Experience, 65 ANTITRUST L.J.
573, 573-74 (1997).
22. Kolasky & Greenfield, supra note 13, at 29.
23. Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 21, at 573-74. The GE-Honeywell deal, for
example, was expected to produce $1.5 billion in synergies. A Memorable Encore:
General Electric: GE's Bid for Honeywell is a Dramatic Finale to Jack Welch's Bril-
liant Career. Fittingly, It is Also a Risky One., ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 2000, at 59.
24. Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 21, at 573-74.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. AND EC MERGER
REGULATIONS
A. How IT ALL BEGAN: THE HISTORICAL PROGRESSION OF U.S.
AND EC REGULATIONS
1. U.S. Merger Regulations
The current emphasis on efficiency in merger review is rela-
tively new.25 Congress enacted § 7 of the Clayton Act during the
progressive era, intending to prevent the accumulation of
26 don
wealth and political power. By doing so, Congress outlawed all
mergers that could "substantially... lessen competition."
27
Contrary to the intent of Congress, however, the Supreme Court
applied § 7 only to stock purchases and analyzed asset acquisi-
tions under the Sherman Act and the "Rule of Reason."28 By
structuring transactions as asset acquisitions, firms could easily
avoid antitrust scrutiny.29
The Court's decision in United States v. Columbia Steel Co.
finally drew the attention of Congress to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of § 7.0 Congress responded by passing the Cel-
ler-Kafauver amendments to the Clayton Act.3 These amend-
ments, as interpreted by the Warren Court, allowed lower courts
to enjoin mergers with a showing of a "reasonable probability" of
25. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 390 (3d ed. 1998).
26. See id. at 353.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2002).
28. The Rule of Reason was first articulated in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and requires that the court examine harm to the public
resulting from the entire practice in question to determine whether or not it violates
the antitrust laws. Id. at 78. This contrasts with other anticompetitive conduct,
such as horizontal minimum price fixing and market division, which the Court has
held to be per se illegal. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210-
18 (1940) (discussing horizontal minimum price fixing); United States v. Sealy Co.,
388 U.S. 350, 356-57 (1967) (discussing horizontal market division).
29. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 25, at 355.
30. See id. at 353. In United States v. Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. 495 (1948), the
Court declared legal a merger that allowed a firm to gain nearly a one-quarter share
of the national market for steel production because it felt that the market conditions
prevented anticompetitive effects. Id. at 526-31.
31. Celler-Kefhaufer Anti-Merger Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125
(codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (2002)); SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 25, at
353-54.
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anticompetitive effects.32 With a series of decisions including
Brown Shoe and Von's Grocery, the Court blocked mergers that
created minimal market concentration.33 The Court, in these
and other decisions, emphasized its intention to preserve the
presence of small business in the economy.34 Even at the peak of
hostility towards mergers, however, the Court stressed that the
antitrust laws were intended to protect "competition, not com-
petitors, and.., to restrain mergers only to the extent that such
combinations may tend to lessen competition."35
At that time, divestiture was the only remedy available to
courts when transactions violated § 7 of the Clayton Act.36 Be-
cause divestiture was a time-consuming remedy and imposed
disproportionately high costs on violating companies, Congress
introduced pre-merger screening through the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act. 37 This Act requires that compa-
nies request clearance from the FTC or DOJ for all mergers and
acquisitions that meet certain thresholds.5 The agencies are
then authorized to seek preliminary injunctions against those
mergers with a "substantial likelihood to lessen competition.
" 39
Courts will grant a preliminary injunction if the agencies dem-
onstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits of the case
in a full administrative proceeding.0 The Act, therefore, vested
power in the agencies to evaluate the competitive effects of
mergers before they were consummated and established inde-
pendent judicial review of those decisions.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2002); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353
U.S. 586, 626 (1957). Du Pont was the first case to address the amended Clayton
Act and held that a merger was illegal if it had a reasonable probability of foreclos-
ing competition at the time it was commenced. This did not require the government
to show actual competitive harm. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra, at 626.
33. Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1963); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 302 (1966).
34. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 314-16.
35. Id. at 320.
36. Kauper, supra note 7, at 310 n.29.
37. Id.; STEPHEN M. AXINN, ET. AL, ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE HART-SCOTT-
RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT § 1.04, at 1-23 (5th ed. 1993).
38. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-435
(codified as 15 U.S.C. § 18A (2002)).
39. Id. The Act requires that a company receive clearance from the agencies if,
inter alia, it is acquiring assets of another company in excess of $15,000,000. The
threshold has recently been increased to $50,000,000. Pub. L. 106-553, § l(a)(2)
(2000).
40. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45
(D.D.C. 1998); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp 1066, 1070-71
(D.D.C. 1997). In order to issue an injunction, a court does not have to determine
that a merger would violate the antitrust laws. Id.
226 [Vol.12:1
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The agencies also made a significant contribution to merger
enforcement in 1984 with the FTC and DOJ Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (Guidelines), a roadmap intended to provide trans-
parency and uniformity to merger enforcement procedures. 41 By
adopting the Guidelines, the agencies acknowledged that merg-
ers have potential competitive benefits. The agencies also
sought to eliminate the uncertainties that stymied companies'
willingness to merge. 2 Commentators generally approved of the
Guidelines and courts largely adopted the agencies' methodology
in preliminary injunction actions. When the agencies revised
the Guidelines in 1997, they granted the wish of Chicago School
economists by making available an "efficiencies defense" to com-
panies that claim their mergers create synergies in excess of the
transaction's anticompetitive effects.44 This evolution resulted
in a U.S. antitrust policy that encourages companies to improve
45their competitiveness by merging and creating cost synergies.
2. European Community Merger Regulations
In the early days of European integration, competition pol-
46icy was a single brick in a larger scheme of market integration.
Competition policy helped drive the formation of the common
market, which arose out of the Coal and Steel Community of the
1950's.47 Even after the formation of the EU and the completion
of the common market, economic integration continued as a goal
41. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (1997) (hereinafter GUIDELINES). The Guidelines were originally
adopted in 1984 and revised in 1992 and 1997 to give increased weight to efficiencies
analysis. Eric J. Stock, Explaining the Differing U.S. and EU Positions on the Boe-
ing/McDonnell-Douglas Merger: Avoiding Another Near-Miss, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON L. 825, 827-28 n.10. This Note will refer to the 1997 version.
42. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 25, at 382.
43. See, e.g., Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. at 53; Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Univ.
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
44. GUIDELINES, supra note 41, § 4.0.
45. See, e.g., LEXECON, THE ECONOMICS OF GE-HONEYWELL (2001); Kolasky &
Greenfield, supra note 13, at 29.
46. Article 2 of the Treaty of Amsterdam states the European Union shall es-
tablish the common market to promote values such as high levels of employment,
sustainable development, non-inflationary economic growth, environmental protec-
tion, and a high standard of living. Treaty Establishing the European Community,
Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997), art. 2 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Article 3 names
"a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted," as a
means to bring about the goals set forth in Article 2. Id. at art. 3; see also Julian
Maitland-Walker, Chapter 1: European Community, in COMPETITION LAWS OF
EUROPE 3 (Julian Maitland-Walker ed., 1995).
47. See Maitland-Walker, supra note 46, at 3.
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of European competition policy."' This is an important distinc-
tion from the United States, where the commerce clause laid the
foundation for a national economic unit independent of the anti-
trust laws.49
The European counterpart to the Sherman and Clayton
Acts came into force with the Treaty of Rome of 1957. Articles
81 and 82 (formerly Articles 85 and 86, respectively) of the
treaty set forth the European Community's competition policy.
50
Article 81 prohibits many of the acts which are considered per se
illegal in the United States, such as price fixing, market divi-
sion, and price discrimination.51 Article 82 is worded more
broadly and prohibits any "abuse by one or more undertakings
of a dominant position."52 This language served as the basis for
European Court of Justice (E.C.J.) decisions holding that a
dominant firm abuses its position by acquiring another firm in
the same market.53 In the late 1980's, the E.C.J. expanded on
this decision by holding that Article 85 (now Article 81) could
prohibit a merger even between two non-dominant firms.54
These decisions prompted the Council of Ministers to adopt
the comprehensive Merger Regulation of 1989. 5 The Merger
Regulation borrows language from Article 82 and forbids any
merger that "creates or strengthens a dominant position as a re-
sult of which effective competition would be significantly im-
peded in the common market or in a substantial part of it."56
48. Id.
49. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949); Valentine,
supra note 8, at 528.
50. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
arts. 85-86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. The Treaty of Amsterdam
integrated these provisions into the current agreement. EC Treaty, supra note 46,
at arts. 81-82.
51. EC Treaty, supra note 46, at arts. 81-82; see discussion of per se illegality
and the rule of reason, supra note 28. The article outlaws, price fixing, output re-
strictions, and price discrimination. EEC Treaty, supra note 50, at art. 81(a), (b), (d).
52. EC Treaty, supra note 46, at art. 82.
53. Europernballage Corp. and Continental Can v. Comm'n: 6/72 [1973] E.C.R.
215; see also Maitland-Walker, supra note 46, at 24.
54. BAT & Reynolds v. Comm'n: 142, 156/84 [1987] E.C.R. 4487; see also Mait-
land-Walker, supra note 46, at 24.
55. Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concen-
trations between Undertakings, 1990 O.J. (L 257) [hereinafter Merger Regulation];
see also Maitland-Walker, supra note 46, at 24-25.
56. Merger Regulation, supra note 55, at art. 2(3). As is the case in the United
States, a Commission investigation of dominance begins with an inquiry into the
relevant product and geographic markets. VALENTINE KORAH, EC COMPETITION LAW
AND PRACTICE §§ 3.2.2-3.3.3, at 110 (6th ed. 1997). Thereafter, in United Brands, the
E.C.J. defined dominance as "a position of economic strength enjoyed by an under-
[Vol.12:l
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The Merger Regulation resembles U.S. regulations in three
ways. First, similar to the Hart-Scott-Rodino reforms under-
taken by Congress, the EC regulation requires pre-merger noti-
fication and approval by the Commission for all transactions
that meet certain "turnover" thresholds." Second, the EC law
imposes jurisdictional limits that restrict the application to
transactions "with a community dimension."5' Third, the crea-
tion of the Merger Task Force, an executive body within DG-IV
specifically empowered to enforce the Merger Regulation, dem-
onstrates another parallel between the European and U.S. pro-
visions.59
taking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the
relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independ-
ently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of consumers." United Brands,
1976 O.J. (L 95/1); on appeal Case 27/76 United Brands v. Comm'n, 1978 E.C.R. 207.
This is basically similar to the U.S. view of monopoly power. See United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
57. Merger Regulation, supra note 55, at art. 4(1). Article 5 lays out a compli-
cated calculation formula for "turnover." It will suffice for purposes of this article,
however, to define turnover as "the total sum derived by the [merging parties] in the
preceding financial year from the sale of products and the provision of services...
after the deduction of sales rebates and VAT, and other taxes directly related to
turnover." RICCARDO CELLI & LOuIS MILLS, EC Merger Control, in CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS, EUROPEAN UNION 11 (Peter F.C. Begg & Jason Haines
eds., 1999).
58. Merger Regulation, supra note 55, at art. 1(1). Mergers are deemed to have
a "community dimension" when the aggregate worldwide turnover exceeds five bil-
lion euros, and the Community-wide turnover exceeds 250 million euros, unless
two-thirds of the parties' Community-wide turnover falls within any single member
state. Id. at art. 1(2). To provide greater uniformity in relation to enforcement by
the individual member states, the Council of Ministers added the -following alterna-
tive means by which a merger can attain a community dimension:
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of the undertakings con-
cerned is more than 2.5 billion euros; and
(b) in each of at least three Member States, the combined aggregate turn-
over of all the undertakings concerned is more than 100 million euros; and
(c) in each of at least three Member States included for the purpose of
point (b), the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings
concerned is more than 25 million euros; and
(d) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least tow of the
undertakings concerned is more than 100 million euros;
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds
of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Mem-
ber State.
Council Regulation 1310/97, 1997 O.J. (L 180/1). This resembles the regulation of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts of commerce "among the several states or with for-
eign nations." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 12 (2002).
59. Maitland-Walker, supra note 46, at 24-25.
2003] 229
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In 1997, the EU also adopted its own Market Definition
Guidelines, which resemble the U.S. Guidelines to a remarkable
degree."° The Commission sought to provide transparency and
consistency to merger review and to encourage procompetitive61
mergers. In this way, the Commission pursued goals that re-
semble those of the U.S. enforcing agencies.6'
3. Positive Comity: The Crossroads of U.S. and EC Competition
Policy
An important convergence in the histories of U.S. and EU
antitrust policy resulted from the Agreement on Positive Com-
ity.63 The U.S. and EU enforcement agencies entered into the
agreement because they foresaw that extraterritorial applica-
tion of merger review could lead to transatlantic friction.64 This
treaty signaled a compromise in that each party recognized the
right of the other to apply its antitrust laws to extraterritorial
transactions, but agreed not to exercise jurisdiction in cases in
which the other party clearly had a stronger interest.6' The
Agreement on Positive Comity is significant for market defini-
tion because it allows the agencies to share information to estab-
lish relevant antitrust markets.5 The agreement has been
largely successful, both as a culmination of a long cooperative
process between agencies and as a basis for further contacts and
consultations. Even though the U.S. and EC rules are not
identical, collaboration between the agencies has, in practice,
60. Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Pur-
poses of Community Competition Law, 1997 O.J. (C 372) [hereinafter Market Defini-
tion Guidelines]; Simon Baker & Lawrence Wu, Applying the Market Definition
Guidelines of the European Commission, 19 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 273, 273
(1998); Robert Pitofsky, EU and U.S. Approaches to International Mergers-Views
from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Remarks at the EC Merger Control 10'
Anniversary Conference to the European Commission Directorate General for Com-
petition and the International Bar Association (Sept. 14-15, 2000), available at
www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/pitintermergers.html.
61. Market Definition Guidelines, supra note 60, at I.
62. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
63. Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the
United States of America Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws,
Sept. 23, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1487 (1991) [hereinafter Comity Agreement].
64. See Valentine, supra note 8, at 527.
65. Comity Agreement, supra note 63, at art. IV(2)(a)(ii). This would apply, for
example, to the merger of two U.S. companies that met the EC "turnover" thresh-
olds, but sold the overwhelming majority of their products in the United States.
66. Id. at art. III.
67. See Valentine, supra note 8, at 530; Pitofsky, supra note 60.
[Vo1.12:1
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68increased convergence.
B. UNBUNDLING THE DIFFERENCES: THE CURRENT STATE OF
MERGER ANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION
1. Market Definition
Notwithstanding their distinct historical roots, merger re-
view in the United States and EC follow similar analytical
paths, which has increased convergence. Both jurisdictions view
the definition of relevant product and geographic markets as
prerequisites to evaluating the effects of a merger.6 9 U.S. and
European analyses of the relevant product market begin by hy-
pothesizing how consumers would respond to a post-merger
price increase.7' Both jurisdictions account for "demand substi-
tution"7 by including in the relevant product market all those
products which consumers would substitute if the merged com-
pany imposed a "small, but significant and nontransitory" price
72 73increase. While supply substitution is used to broaden the
68. See Valentine, supra note 8, at 530-31; Pitofsky, supra note 60; see also
Wilke, supra note 8 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Charles James that in-
creased consultations were needed after GE-Honeywell to foster greater conver-
gence).
69. Compare GUIDELINES, supra note 41, § 1.0, with Market Definition Guide-
lines, supra note 60, at I.
70. Compare GUIDELINES, supra note 41, § 1.0, with Market Definition Guide-
lines, supra note 60, at I.
71. Demand side substitution occurs when customers switch their purchases
from one supplier to another in response to a relative price change. This is often the
most direct and immediate constraint on firms. Baker & Wu, supra note 60, at 275.
72. This phrase is used throughout the FTC and DOJ Guidelines to analyze
how customers of the merging parties would behave if the merged company in-
creased its prices. GUIDELINES, supra note 41, § 1.0. The EU uses similar language.
See Market Definition Guidelines, supra note 60, at 11 ("hypothetical small,
non-transitory change in relative prices"). The level of increase required to be "small
but significant" is also similar in the jurisdictions. The standards are a five percent
increase in the United States, and a five to ten percent increase in the EU.
GUIDELINES, supra note 41, § 1.11; Market Definition Guidelines, supra note 60, at
II. If, for example, two soft drink manufacturers planned to merge, the United
States and EU enforcers would ask whether, in the event of a price increase, con-
sumers would switch over to juice, coffee, or other brands of soft drinks. If consum-
ers would substitute one of these products for the beverages of the merged parties,
the companies would have no incentive to raise prices, so the merger would raise no
competitive concerns.
73. Supply substitution refers to the willingness of firms to produce more of a
particular good in response to a competitor's price increase. GUIDELINES, supra note
41, § 1.32.
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relevant market for purposes of DG-IV's analysis, the FTC and
DOJ Guidelines consider only uncommitted74 firms, thereby nar-
rowing the market.75 Uncommitted supply substitutability di-
lutes calculations of market share, which reduces the likelihood
of a challenge to a merger in both the U.S. and EC frameworks."5
The similarity of market definition in the United States and EU
is a strong foundation for further convergence.
2. Analysis of Competitive Effects
While the U.S. enforcing agencies and the Commission gen-
erally agree on how to define markets, their approaches in ana-
lyzing the effects in each market differ. The United States scru-
tinizes mergers based upon the belief that oligopoly power" in
the hands of a few firms creates interdependence and frees
firms from the restraints of competition.7 s According to U.S.
theory, if only a few firms exist in a market, each will realize
that they cannot profit by lowering prices and will explicitly or
tacitly settle on an equilibrium price that is above competitive
levels."5 Because the United States views competitors in an oli-
74. Uncommitted firms are those that can begin producing goods for the rele-
vant market without making any significant long-term investments by shifting re-
sources from the production of one product to another. Those firms that can only
enter the market after significant investments specific to production in the relevant
market are committed firms. See, e.g., GUIDELINES, supra note 41, § 1.0 n.7.
75. Compare GUIDELINES, supra note 41, § 1.32, with Market Definition Guide-
lines, supra note 60, at II.
76. Baker & Wu, supra note 60, at 275; Pitofsky, supra note 60. In both juris-
dictions, uncommitted entry can rebut presumptions of anticompetitiveness in a
merger that increases market share. Compare Market Definition Guidelines, supra
note 60, at II, with GUIDELINES, supra note 41, § 3.0.
77. Oligopoly is characterized as a few firms in a market, each possessing mar-
ket power, that perceive that they can increase profits by acting interdependently
instead of independently. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 25, at 26.
78. GUIDELINES, supra note 41, §§ 2.1-2.12; Kauper, supra note 7, at 322-23.
79. See Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir.
1986); GUIDELINES, supra note 41, §§ 2.1-2.12; Kauper, supra note 7, at 322-23. A
hypothetical example from the airline industry demonstrates this theory. Imagine
that Airline A and Airline B, both oligopolists, each charge $200 for a ticket from
New York to Los Angeles and that each receives fifty percent of the market share.
Assume further that each operates with average costs equal to $100 per ticket. If A
lowers its price to $150, its profits per ticket would decrease, but its total profits
would increase, as it would grab 100 percent of the market. Fearing a complete loss
of business, B would immediately lower its prices to $150, which would create an
equilibrium in which each airline has the same market share as before, only with
half the profits. Interdependence theory is concerned that, over time, the airlines
will realize that it is not in their best interest to lower fares, and therefore will
maintain super competitive prices.
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gopolistic market as potential partners in collusion, there is lit-
tle reason to consider the strength of those competitors in
merger analysis.80
Unlike the U.S. agencies, the Commission has primarily
been concerned with monopoly power. 8 This leads European of-
ficials to view firms in an oligopolistic market as potential com-
petitors instead of potential colluders.82 In contrast to the U.S.
view, the Commission assumes that, even in an oligopolistic
market, strong competitors can offset the merged firm's domi-
nance. 83 In light of recent EC decisions, however, these distinc-
tions overstate the differences between the theories of the two
jurisdictions. In a line of Commission and E.C.J. decisions be-
ginning with the challenge to a merger between Nestle and Per-
rier and another blocking the merger of pharmaceutical com-
pany Kali und Salz with MdK and Treuhand, the EU has begun
to consider interdependent behavior as collective dominance in
violation of Article 11 of the Merger Regulation. 4 Despite the
differing U.S. and EC theories of competitive harm, executive
and judicial decisions in the two jurisdictions have led to con-
vergence in the analysis of market definition and participation .
5
3. Divergent Treatment of Efficiencies
Some of the strongest claims of divergence between the U.S.
and EU approaches have addressed the failure of the Commis-
sion to incorporate defenses, namely the efficiencies defense,into its review8 U.S. business leaders have focused their
strongest criticism against Community merger policy on this
point, claiming that the Commission harms businesses and con-
sumers by preventing synergistic mergers. They argue that ef-
ficiency-enhancing mergers benefit consumers by lowering pro-
80. See Kauper, supra note 7, at 335.
81. See id. at 329-31; Korah, supra note 56, §§ 10.2.5-10.2.5.3, at 268-70.
82. See, e.g., Joined Cases C 68/94 & C 30/95, France v. Comm., 1998 E.C.R.
1-375, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 829 (1998) [hereinafter Kali-Saiz]; see also Kauper, supra
note 7, at 335-36.
83. Kauper, supra note 7, at 335-36.
84. Id. at 330; Kali-Salz, supra note 82.
85. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
86. See Europe to GE: Go Home, supra note 1; Stock, supra note 41, at 869-70;
LEXECON, supra note 45.
87. Europe to GE: Go Home, supra note 1; George L. Priest & Franco Romani,
The GE/Honeywell Precedent, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2001, at Al; Kolasky &
Greenfield, supra note 13, at 29.
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duction costs and decreasing prices."9 U.S. regulators account
for consumer benefit by weighing evidence of merger-specific ef-
ficiencies against any merger-related anticompetitive effects.
Although the FTC and DOJ embraced the efficiencies
analysis, U.S. courts have been uncertain and inconsistent in
their application of the defense. 90 The Guidelines themselves
provide only vague guidance, stating that the agencies will ap-
prove mergers creating efficiencies that eliminate the likelihood
of anticompetitive effects in all relevant markets. 91 This vague-
ness has caused difficulty for courts that have attempted to
quantify merger-specific efficiencies.92 Courts have also had dif-
ficulty determining whether the defense requires proof that
93merging firms will pass efficiencies on to consumers.
4. European Commission's "Portfolio Theory"
While the desirability of an efficiencies defense provided a
common battleground for proponents of the U.S. and EU sys-
tems, the most significant disagreements arose over the Com-
mission's "portfolio theory," the doctrine used to block the GE-
Honeywell deal.94 Under the portfolio theory, a company in a
88. LEXECON, supra note 45.
89. GUIDELINES, supra note 41, § 4.0. The Guidelines clarify that, as merger-
induced concentration increases, firms will face a stricter burden of proof in justify-
ing a transaction's anticompetitive effects. Id.; see also Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Sta-
ples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1088-89 (D.D.C. 1997) (stating that it is "not entirely
clear" whether courts have adopted the Guidelines integration of an efficiencies de-
fense, but nonetheless applying such a defense in a merger between two office su-
perstore chains).
90. Thomas L. Greaney, Not for Import: Why the EU Should not Adopt the
American Efficiency Defense for Analyzing Mergers and Joint Ventures, 44 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 871, 893 (2000).
91. GUIDELINES, supra note 41, §4.0.
92. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1089 (D.D.C.
1997) (explaining that "where... the merger has not yet been consummated, it is
impossible to quantify precisely the efficiencies that it will generate"). The Staples
court relied largely on historical evidence to dismiss as unreliable the efficiency de-
fense raised by office superstores Staples and Office Depot. Id. at 1089-90; see also
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 62-63 (D.D.C. 1998)
(stating that a merger's efficiencies were insufficient to rebut a presumption of anti-
competitive effects even though the government conceded that it would produce over
$150 million in synergies).
93. Compare Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1090 (finding that history did not support
Defendants' contention that they would pass significant savings on to consumers),
with Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 62-63 (finding that a projected decrease in
defendants' pass-through percentage mitigated against allowing an efficiencies de-
fense).
94. Kolasky & Greenfield, supra note 13, at 28; Hill & Done, supra note 1.
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dominant position could engage in "mixed bundling,"95 whereby
it would sell products in bundles at relatively low prices, while
increasing the relative price of the individual components sold
separately.96 In order for customers to receive the benefit of the
merged firm's pricing efficiency, they must purchase the entire
bundle.97 The merged company could then engage in price dis-
crimination against those customers who chose to mix a product
of the merged company with one of a competitor.98 According to
the portfolio theory, such a merger could lead to lower prices on
bundles in the short run but would foreclose competition and al-
low the merged firm to charge monopoly prices in the long run.99
The Commission has applied the portfolio theory in a num-
ber of merger cases, starting in 1998 with the merger of the al-
cohol distributors, Guinness and Grand Metropolitan. 0 Al-
though the Commission conditionally approved the merger, it
found that the parties could bundle their combined products and
price the bundles strategically to undercut competiors.' o Two
years later, the Commission applied similar logic when it ap-
proved the Air Liquide-BOC merger.0 2 The Commission hy-
pothesized that a bundling problem could exist because the
merging companies, one French and one British, could offer
package deals to procure the business of customers operating in
both France and the United Kingdom. 103 The Commission also
envisioned a situation in which the merged company could
charge monopoly prices in its home markets to cross-subsidize
95. Mixed bundling is a practice, by which companies sell products both in
bundles and as stand-alone products. This contrasts with "pure bundling," or tying,
in which a company only sells its products together. LEXECON, supra note 45.
96. FRONTIER ECONOMICS, UNBUNDLING THE ARGUMENTS: ECONOMIC ISSUES
RAISED BY THE PROPOSED GE-HONEYWELL MERGER 2 (2001), available at
http://www.frontier-economics.com/bulletins/en/23.pdf. Frontier Economics is a con-
sulting firm retained by Rolls Royce, a competitor of GE, during the Commission's
investigation. The merged firm can be expected to do this if it sells complementary
products. Complements are products that are usually consumed together, such that
a decrease in the price of one product leads to an increase in the demand for its com-
plement. Id.
97. Id.; LEXECON, supra note 45.
98. LEXECON, supra note 45.
99. FRONTIER ECONOMICS, supra note 96.
100. Commission Decision 98/602/EC 1998 O.J. (L 288) paras. 99-100.
101. Id. The FTC also required the parties to divest assets in order to secure
approval, however, it did so based on the horizontal effects the merger would have in
the United States. Complaint of the Fed. Trade Comm'n paras. 17-20, In the matter
of Guinness PLC, a corporation, and Grand Metropolitan PLC, a corporation, F.T.C.
(No. 971 008 1), available at www.ftc.gov/os/1998/980419710081.do.htm.
102. LEXECON, "INDIRECT EFFECTS" IN MERGER ANALYSIS (2000).
103. Id.
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predatory behavior in other markets. 4
In the GE-Honeywell case, the EU's most recent application
of the portfolio theory, the Commission addressed potential
bundling effects in several relevant markets.105 The Commission
concluded that the merged GE-Honeywell could offer packages
of products to customers that consist of aircraft engines, for
which GE was dominant, with avionics equipment, Honeywell's
area of dominance.06 The merged company could offer discounts
on bundles that neither could offer on their respective individual
products. 7 The Commission reasoned that, since Honeywell
had already bundled various types of avionics together in the
past, the parties could add components of GE's aircraft engine
portfolio to their bundles.' In the short run, this would have
the effect of isolating competitors from the market. 9 In the
long run, the Commission concluded that this behavior could
drive competitors out of the market and lead to near monopoly
power for the merged company." ° The Commission concluded
that this would happen regardless of the company's inten-
tions."' Furthermore, the Commission found that the parties
could "leverage" their dominant positions in one market into
other markets by tying products in which the company has a
monopoly with products in which the company faces competi-
tion. L 2 This problem would be particularly acute if GE engaged
in "technical bundling," by programming their equipment not to
function with non-GE components."'
Contrary to commentators' assertions of divergence, the be-
havior that the Commission envisioned, if it occurs post-merger,
is actionable under U.S. law."' Despite scholarly criticism, ver-
tical tying arrangements are still considered per se illegal under
104. Id.
105. General Electric/Honeywell, Case No. COMP/M.2220 para. 8 (2001).
106. Id. para. 415.
107. Id. paras. 350-51, 353.
108. Id. paras. 361-70.
109. Id. para. 354.
110. Id.
111. General Electric/Honeywell, supra note 105, para. 353.
112. Id. para. 415.
113. Id. para. 351.
114. For an example of a claim of divergence, see Kolasky & Greenfield, supra
note 13, at 28. U.S. plaintiffs may maintain antitrust actions based on theories of
tying, Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984), and cross-subsidization,
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). See
discussion infra notes 127-29 of why these theories are insufficient to block a pro-
posed merger.
[Vol.12:1
2003] THE CANADIAN MIDDLE ROAD
the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 115 Similar to the Commission's
allegations regarding GE's aircraft financing division, GECAS,
the Supreme Court has held that credit can be a tying product
in a monopolization action. 16 Most recently, the D.C. Circuit, in
the Microsoft case, concluded that the software manufacturer's
"technical bundling" practices violated § 2 of the Sherman Act
under a monopolization theory.
1 17
The Commission's theories of leveraging also resemble the
U.S. prohibition on cross-subsidization."' In the United States,
cross-subsidization is illegal regardless of whether the practice
results from a merger or unilateral conduct." 9 U.S. courts view
theories of cross-subsidization as plausible but place extremely
high substantive and procedural 120 bars to actions based on
cross-subsidization. 2 1 Substantively, a plaintiff must demon-
strate that the defendant priced below cost and had a possibility
of recoupment of its losses.122 Because the plaintiff has to pro-
duce evidence of below-cost pricing, it cannot use potential
cross-subsidization as a basis for blocking a merger before con-
115. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12. While the holding in Jefferson Parish
represents the current state of the law, the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor
that tying should be analyzed under a modified rule of reason analysis carries heavy
persuasive value. Id. at 34-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. Fortner Enter. v. United States Steel, 394 U.S. 495, 508 (1965).
117. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 60-62 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The
court upheld the trial court's conclusion that Microsoft violated the Sherman Act in
three ways: preventing Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) from removing
any icons from desktop or "Start Menu" of the Windows operating system, and pre-
venting them from altering the initial boot sequence, the images a user sees as she
starts her PC. Id. at 62. This, the court concluded, had the effect of isolating com-
peting internet browser manufacturers from the market. Id.
118. Cross-subsidization refers to a firm with a monopoly in one market using
its monopoly profits to subsidize below-cost pricing in another market to drive out
competitors. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW,
POLICY AND PROCEDURE 989 (4th ed. 1999).
119. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (af-
firming a private plaintiffs ability to block a merger based on § 7 Clayton Act, but
concluding that Monfort was not injured "by anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws").
120. See Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597-98
(1986) (holding that to survive summary judgment, antitrust plaintiffs must present
evidence that "tend [s] to exclude the possibility" that defendants acted pursuant to a
legitimate business motive).
121. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209 (1993).
122. Id. at 222, 224. ("For the investment to be rational, the [predator] must
have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits,
more than the losses suffered.") (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-89).
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
summation. 23
In response to the GE-Honeywell decision, commentators
criticized the Commission for attacking the parties with an "effi-
ciencies offense" instead of allowing them to rebut anticompeti-
tive presumptions with claims of efficiencies." 4 These criticisms
are justified to the extent that the Commission itself acknowl-
edged that its hypothesized anticompetitive effects would result
from GE-Honeywell's profit maximizing behavior, absent any
predatory intent.' In this way, the EU's analysis takes a sharp
turn from the lynchpin of U.S. merger analysis that the anti-
trust laws are meant to protect competition, not competitors."6
The greatest weakness of the GE-Honeywell decision lies in
its speculative nature. 7  Even by the Commission's logic, any
exit of competitors caused by the merger would occur only in the
medium to long run."' Even though pre-merger screening is in-
herently speculative as to anticompetitive effects, competition
agencies must predict future events.' 2' Accordingly, the United
States only considers those anticompetitive effects that would
materialize within two years of a merger.130 The U.S. enforce-
ment agencies are willing to clear some potentially anticompeti-
tive mergers because they have strong post-merger remedies,
such as divestiture, to address competitive concerns that arise
post-merger."' The EU, in contrast, does not have strong
post-merger remedies at their disposal, so its merger review
process becomes a "one-shot" chance to stop future anticompeti-
tive effects." 2 Therefore, based on the present EU analysis, en-
123. See generally Cargill, 479 U.S. at 117-18 (describing the standard for
predatory pricing and holding that Monfort lacks standing to block Cargill's acquisi-
tion).
124. See LEXECON, supra note 45; Kolasky & Greenfield, supra note 13, at 28;
Peter Spiegel, US to Press EU Over GE-Honeywell Antitrust Argument, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2001, at A12 (quoting Charles James that Commission decision "punishes
efficiency" and "punishes success").
125. General Electric/Honeywell, supra note 105, para. 353.
126. See supra text accompanying note 35.
127. See LEXECON, supra note 45.
128. General Electric/Honeywell, supra note 105, para. 354.
129. See LEXECON, supra note 45.
130. GUIDELINES, supra note 41, § 3.2; see also Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Cardinal
Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 55 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that U.S. courts will give
weight to short run effects of mergers); Kolasky & Greenfield, supra note 13, at
38-39.
131. See Raghaven & Davis, supra note 4, at All.
132. Philip Shishkin, Barred Merger Signals U.S.-EU Divergence, WALL ST. J.,
July 5, 2001, at A4. The EU's competition commissioner, Mario Monti, was quoted
as saying "we have a one-shot possibility to approve or block a merger." Id.
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forcement agencies have to look to prospective events and weigh
them more critically.
III. SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND THEIR
CRITIQUES
When the Commission nearly blocked the Boe-
ing-McDonnell Douglas merger in 1997, a number of remedies to
the difficulties of extraterritorial antitrust enforcement were
proposed. European officials reiterated their desire for a bind-
ing international antitrust agreement, possibly integrated into
the World Trade Organization (WTO) as part of the Dispute Set-
tlement Mechanism.'33 Others have called for the voluntary
consultations in regional and national fora to settle competition
disputes, possibly through the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD).' U.S. business leaders and
scholars urged the EU to adopt the U.S. efficiency and "failing
firm" defenses in the wake of the GE-Honeywell decision.1 3'
While antitrust commentators disagree over the proper
place for efficiency analysis in merger review, nearly all agree
that allocative efficiency should be at least one goal of interna-
tional antitrust enforcement. 36 Therefore, this Note will urge
that any reforms in European or international competition pol-
icy be undertaken with the goal of increasing global output.
Substantive agreement on competition policy can promote global
efficiency by reducing the differences in national antitrust poli-
cies, thereby reducing compliance costs, 13' encouraging efficiency
enhancing transactions, and eliminating barriers to trade. 39
133. See Valentine, supra note 8, at 529 (describing the support of former EC
trade commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, for a binding set of international antitrust
rules); Guy de Jonquieres, WTO Urged to Set Up Basic Competition Rules, FIN.
TIMES, June 18, 1996, at 4.
134. See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Address before the Fordham Corporate Law
Institute 27th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct.
19, 2000), in 1230 PLI/CoRP. 415, 420.
135. Spiegel, supra note 124, at A12. See generally Greaney, supra note 90, at
872-74 (describing the development of the efficiencies defense in the U.S. and
movements to implement similar provisions in EC merger review).
136. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford & E. Thomas Sullivan, Can International Anti-
trust be Saved for the Post Boeing Merger World? A Proposal to Minimize Interna-
tional Conflict and to Rescue Antitrust from Misuse, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 55, 67
(2000).
137. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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Aside from promoting efficiency, any changes in interna-
tional antitrust enforcement should seek to preserve the right of
individual jurisdictions to promote their own domestic policy
goals through their own competition laws. 140  Domestic goals
should play the most prominent role in determining the degree
to which competition laws should encourage wealth transfers
from producers to consumers or vice versa."' Accordingly, na-
tions at various stages of development may tolerate varying de-
grees of concentration in order to further their industrial poli-
cies.' 4 ' Furthermore, enforcement agencies may disagree on the
desirability of concentrating political and economic power into a
few hands for political reasons.14 ' Any changes in global compe-
tition policy should, therefore, preserve the right of national of-
ficials to make distributive decisions at the national level, free
from international interference.
A. A PROPOSAL FOR A BINDING INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
AGREEMENT
Intuitively, nations should resolve their disagreements over
antitrust enforcement through an established mechanism, such
as the WTO. After all, the WTO developed a set of binding Mul-
tilateral Trade Agreements and established a dispute settle-
ment mechanism in once divisive areas of trade policy.' 44 The
legitimacy and uniformity of the rules of the WTO have allowed
substantial advances in globalization to take place since the
WTO's inception.'
45
During the past decade, commentators and political leaders
proposed a number of supranational answers to the challenge of
extraterritorial application of competition laws. Some proposals
merely required agreement among nations on minimum stan-
140. See Valentine, supra note 8, at 527.
141. See generally Greaney, supra note 90, at 875-76, 892 (addressing this con-
cept as it relates to the "efficiencies defense" in merger review).
142. See Valentine, supra note 8, at 527-28.
143. See generally Eleanor M. Fox, supra note 15, at 596-97 (discussing the ways
in which antitrust policy is intertwined with other areas of domestic affairs).
144. See Brian Peck, Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws and the
U.S.-EU Dispute over the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Merger: From Comity to
Conflict? An Argument for a Binding International Agreement on Antitrust Enforce-
ment and Dispute Resolution, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163, 1208-10 (1998). Some of
these areas include antidumping procedures, intellectual property rights and agri-
cultural policy. Id.
145. See Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy in the Context of the
WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097, 1099-1101 (1995).
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dards of enforcement in key areas of competition policy, such as
cartel behavior. 146 The previous attempt by OECD members to
agree on antitrust standards provides the most prominent ex-
ample of such a proposal.1 17 At the other end of the spectrum
lies a comprehensive global antitrust code, with binding dispute
settlement and enforcement procedures.4 ' A prime example of
such a code was the draft International Antitrust Code, pro-
posed by a group of academics in Munich in 1993, who sug-
gested that their code be adopted as a GATT-WTO-Plurilateral
trade agreement.
149
The proposal of global competition scholar Eleanor Fox fits
somewhere between these two points. Fox suggested that na-
tions agree to general principles of enforcement in the areas of
cartels and market access, and integrate this agreement into the
WTO. 5 ° To cure some of the potential implementation problems
in developing countries, others have suggest that lesser devel-
oped countries receive a grace period before they are expected to
fully comply with a global competition agreement.15 ' This
piecemeal implementation would resemble current WTO trade-
in-services provisions. 52
The proponents of multilateral antitrust agreements are
correct to point out that such agreements promote efficiency in
enforcement and further liberalization of trade. Whereas extra-
territorial application of national antitrust laws increases the
transaction costs of multinational mergers, a single competition
code would limit the costs of antitrust compliance to those costs
necessary to adhere to the international code. 153 This reduction
in transaction costs would encourage firms to market their
goods internationally and seek efficiencies by engaging in
146. Valentine, supra note 8, at 529.
147. Id.
148. See Peck, supra note 144, at 1209 (arguing for complete integration of com-
petition policy into the WTO); Matsushita, supra note 145, at 1113-14 (advocating
the integration of general U.S.-like principles of merger review into the WTO).
149. Daniel J. Gifford, The Draft International Antitrust Code Proposed at Mu-
nich: Good Intentions Gone Awry, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 4 (1996).
150. See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging
the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POLY J. 1, 30-31 (1995).
151. See Matsushita, supra note 145, at 1114-15.
152. Id. Trade-in-services refers to the international transactions within sectors
such as banking, tourism, and communications. In the WTO framework, these are
governed by the General Agreement on Trade in Services. See JOHN H. JACKSON,
WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 291 (3d ed. 1995).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
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1 1 '54
cross-border mergers. Standardizing competition policy would
lead to a greater liberalization of trade and would enhance eco-
nomic welfare.' Therefore competition rules should be inte-
grated into the WTO or promoted at the international level.
B. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
Notwithstanding these benefits, a supranational competi-
tion regulation would encounter a number of philosophical and
practical difficulties that would outweigh the utility of a single
code. As a practical matter, any multinational organization
would consist of members at various stages of development, and
these members would have difficulty reaching consensus on the
details of an agreement.'5 Many signatories would likely see a
supranational body as an encroachment upon national indus-
trial policies that are necessary for development. 157 The specific-
ity of a global competition agreement could lead to further prob-
lems. In both the United States and the EU, competition laws
are phrased broadly, leaving the courts great discretion to shape
policy in accordance with dynamic economic scholarship.
5 8
Leaving such discretion in the hands of the WTO or another
multinational organization with a more fluid dispute settlement
body would not provide the benefits of a deliberately evolving
antitrust jurisprudence.' Conversely, any attempt to draft a
more rigid set of rules would allow no flexibility and would en-
counter opposition from countries that feel that the regulations
do not specifically reflect their needs. 6 o
154. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
155. See Matsushita, supra note 145, at 1099-1101, 1104 (arguing that competi-
tion policy can promote trade liberalization).
156. See Valentine, supra note 8, at 529.
157. See generally id. at 528-29 (stating that competition laws reflect nations'
histories and values); Diane P. Wood, International Competition Policy in a Diverse
World: Can One Size Fit All?, 191 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 71-85 (1992), reprinted
in JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES supra note 152, at 1100-1107 (demonstrating that na-
tions at different stages of industrial development have different goals for competi-
tion laws and arguing that the international community should recognize their need
to pursue these goals).
158. See Valentine, supra note 8, at 529.
159. See Valentine, supra note 8, at 529. As opposed to national courts, which
employ permanent judges, the GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism relies on ad
hoc panels of trade experts to settle disputes. See JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra
note 152, at 327.
160. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text. By defining antitrust policy
specifically, policy makers would take away from the judiciary the power to interpret
regulations in light of current trends in the discipline of economics.
[Vol.12:1
THE CANADIAN MIDDLE ROAD
Moreover, a single competition regulation would run con-
trary to the principles of the WTO in two respects. First,
whereas the WTO allows signatories to protect domestic com-
petitors by negotiating tariff agreements with other nations, a
global competition authority would necessarily protect competi-
tion at the expense of competitors. 161 Because an international
set of competition rules would not allow for this option of bar-
gained-for protection, it would be inherently more difficult to in-
tegrate into a WTO-based trading order than, for example, envi-
ronmental policy. Second, unlike the WTO, which preserves the
right of signatories to promote national industrial policies, stan-
dardizing competition regulations would strip countries of an
important tool with which to pursue domestic goals.162 By re-
stricting the activity of private firms, antitrust policy makes
subjective judgments about the desirability of transfers of mo-
nopoly or oligopoly profits from business to consumers. 163 Be-
cause these questions get to the heart of domestic policy, world
leaders should hesitate to take these decisions away from na-
tional policy makers.
C. EUROPEAN ADOPTION OF THE U.S. EFFICIENCY DEFENSE
U.S. business and political leaders have been the most vocal
advocates for changes in the EC merger regulation. 64  Aside
from labeling the GE-Honeywell decision as protectionist, critics
have proffered sound economic arguments suggesting that the
EC regulation unwisely punished efficiency in business. 165 Many
have urged that the EU adopt the "efficiencies defense" utilized
by the FTC and DOJ, in order to encourage future synergistic
161. See Matsushita, supra note 145, at 1104.
162. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
163. See Wood, supra note 157, at 1106-07 (concluding that countries should not
adopt an U.S.-style "one-size-fits-all" approach to competition policy, so that they
can pursue their own goals though antitrust).
164. See Hill & Done, supra note 1 (quoting Senators Kohl and DeWine that the
diverging conclusions over GE-Honeywell evidence the "need for further examina-
tion of the various processes and standards used by the different agencies"); Carney,
supra note 4, at 8 ("If a change can be effected, there is hope that the commission
will be forced to move from a standard that punishes success to one that merely re-
quires companies not to break law.").
165. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (highlighting economic ar-
gument against "efficiencies offense"). It is important to note that "efficiency" in this
context refers to a specific affirmative defense to a prima facie case that a merger
has anticompetitive effects. This differs from the concept of efficiency used infra
Part II.A.1, which refers to the cost savings that would result from decreasing the
regulatory barriers to mergers and acquisitions.
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mergers.'66 Underlying these proposals was a belief that the
promotion of allocative efficiencies should be the primary goal of
antitrust enforcement.
167
The Commission, by incorporating efficiencies analysis into
its merger review, could theoretically maximize economic wel-
fare in two ways. First, if the EU adopted the efficiencies de-
fense, it would decrease the likelihood that the United States
and EU would reach divergent conclusions. 168 However, this un-
doubtedly assumes that the EU will follow the U.S. technique of
weighing merger-specific efficiencies against anticompetitive ef-
fects. 69 Secondly, if more transnational mergers are able to se-
cure approval by both bodies, the global economy will realize
greater increases in allocative efficiency that mega-mergers,
such as GE-Honeywell, would produce. 170 Thus, a European effi-
ciencies defense would increase aggregate global welfare by re-
ducing the regulatory costs associated with blocking mergers
and by allowing merged companies to reap the full efficiency
gains of combining.
171
D. DRAWBACKS OF A EUROPEAN EFFICIENCIES DEFENSE
Notwithstanding the increases in allocative efficiency that
could result if the Commission incorporated efficiency analysis
into the EC Merger Regulation, the benefits of such a reform are
not as certain as some claim.172 The U.S. efficiencies defense has
hardly increased certainty, given the disparate treatment U.S.
166. See Deborah Hargreaves & Andrew Hill, Brussels Says it Intends to Block
GE-Honeywell Deal, FIN. TIMES, June 19, 2001, at A13, available at 2001 WL
25828930; Kevin Done, Airbus Accused of Opposing GE-Honeywell Deal, FIN. TIMES,
June 17, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25827319 (stating the concern of Boeing chair-
man Harry Stonecipher that aggressive merger enforcement in the EU could ham-
per global trade).
167. See Raghaven & Davis, supra note 4, at All (presenting Clinton official's
dissatisfaction with the Commission blocking mergers based solely on efficiency);
Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Competitiveness, and the World Arena: Efficiencies and
Failing Firms in Perspective, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 725, 730 (1996); see also supra notes
90-93 and accompanying text (outlining the role of efficiencies in United States
merger review and the justification for its incorporation); Greaney, supra note 90, at
876-77 (contrasting merger analysis centered on allocative efficiencies with one
based on protecting consumer welfare).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
169. See generally Greaney, supra note 90, at 892 (showing how even U.S. courts
have been inconsistent in their application of the efficiencies defense). This causes
the purported predictability benefits of the efficiency defense to disappear.
170. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Mitchener, supra note 5, at A12.
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courts give the defense. 173 Based on the U.S. experience, it is
unlikely that a Euro-efficiency defense would increase certainty
in international business.174
Furthermore, because competition and industrial policy are
so closely related, the efficiencies defense provides enforcement
agencies with an opportunity to abuse the defense as a tool for
protectionism."' When efficiencies and anticompetitive effects
are measured on a global scale, countries may be tempted to
balance efficiencies "at home" against effects abroad.1 7 6 While
these transactions may promote the goal of global efficiency,
they run the risk of increasing international tensions over com-
petition policy, as enforcement officials in affected nations will
inevitably attempt to block a merger after clearance in the
merging firms' home countries.
1 77
If the EU adopted an efficiencies defense for the purpose of
increasing convergence, it would strip itself of the power to
make distributive decisions on a union-wide level. When the
U.S. agencies integrated the efficiencies defense into the Guide-
lines, they made a policy judgment that they would consider ef-
ficiency together with competition in their merger review. As
international antitrust scholar Eleanor Fox points out, the two
goals do not overlap completely. 7 8 A merger may create syner-
gies that do not "balance out" the transaction's anticompetitive
effects.1 79  Furthermore, many of these savings may not be
passed on from producers to consumers.' Some proponents of
the efficiency defense would encourage even those transactions
that do not pass on savings to consumers, provided that the cost
savings to the merging companies are greater than the dead-
weight loss'"' created by the transaction.'82 When these savings
are not passed on to consumers, the efficiencies created by
173. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
174. See Greaney, supra note 90, at 893; supra notes 90-93 and accompanying
text.
175. See Greaney, supra note 90, at 893; see also Fox, supra note 167, at 726-27.
176. See Greaney, supra note 90, at 893; Fox, supra note 167, at 726-27.
177. See generally Greaney, supra note 90, at 893 (describing the tensions that
can result from the protection of domestic industry through competition policy).
178. Fox, supra note 167, at 730.
179. See id. at 731.
180. See id.
181. Deadweight loss is the measure of the amount that consumers would be
willing to pay for the output that was lost in a monopolistic market. BORK, supra
note 19, at 108.
182. Id.
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mergers foster wealth transfers from consumers to producers. 83
Transfers of wealth invoke normative policy judgments and
comprise one of the fundamental areas of national primacy in
policymaking.
A European efficiency defense accordingly falls short of the
goals of international antitrust enforcement, efficiency en-
hancement, and sovereignty preservation. The potential of the
defense to increase global allocative efficiency would suffer if the
EU applied the defense with the same inconsistency as U.S.
courts. Such a change in EC merger regulations would also run
the risk of allowing the Commission to promote its industrial
policy at the expense of non-European consumers. Finally, any
such reform would change the amount of protection that EC
competition law affords to producers and consumers, and there-
fore should lie within the realm of Community policy.
E. THE MIDDLE ROAD: THE CANADIAN SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEMS OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL REVIEW
A balance between the goals of maximizing global efficiency
and protecting the EU's autonomy may be found in the Cana-
dian approach to merger review. After facing difficulties review-
ing mergers under its criminal antitrust statutes, the Canadian
Parliament enacted the Competition Act of 1985.'84 Canada
adopted substantive standards that mimic the analysis of mar-
ket definition, concentration, and barriers to entry embodied in
the Guidelines.' Part IX of the Act also established jurisdic-
tional requirements and filing thresholds and timelines that re-
sembled the Hart-Scott-Rodino reforms.8 6
Along with the soundness of Canada's substantive merger
regulations, that procedure holds a partial solution to some of
the problems of multijurisdictional review. Aside from the pre-
merger filing requirements codified in Part IX, parties seeking
Canadian clearance have the option of securing an Advanced
Ruling Certificate (ARC), a confidential advisory opinion by the
183. Id.
184. Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 21, at 577. The ensuing legislation was
known as the Competition Act. Competition Act, R.S.C. ch. C-34 (1985) (Can.) (as
amended) [hereinafter Competition Act].
185. Competition Act, supra note 184, §§ 92-93; Goldman & Bodrug, supra note
21, at 582-83.
186. Competition Act, supra note 184, §§ 109-24; Goldman & Bodrug, supra note
21, at 580; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting Hart-Scott-Rodino
filing thresholds).
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Canadian Competition Bureau (Bureau) on the legality of a187
merger. When parties file for an ARC, they are exempted
from the Part IX timelines, and if they receive a certificate, they
are guaranteed that the Bureau will not challenge the merger
based on any information included in the ARC application. 8
Upon denial of an ARC or completion of a full merger inves-
tigation under Part IX, the Act provides the Bureau with a
number of options. The Bureau may approve the merger un-
conditionally, 89 or at the other end of the spectrum, may file for
an interim injunction against the transaction.' If the Bureau
has specific concerns that are insufficient to warrant a pre-
merger injunction, the Act empowers the Bureau to monitor the
merger for up to three years after consummation of the
merger. 9' This allows the Canadian authorities to evaluate
whether their antitrust concerns or the parties' claims of cost-
savings will materialize, without stymieing a potentially syner-
gistic merger.192
Efficiency gains from any reforms in the Community's
merger regulation would only surface in those few cases in
which consultation and cooperation between the United States
and the EU do not produce similar results in the two jurisdic-
tions. ' A Canadian-style post-merger review system has the
potential to reduce the regulatory costs of multijurisdictional
merger review in a number of ways. For the marginal cases in
which U.S. and European regulators disagree, post-merger re-
view may give the Commission the confidence to approve deals
on which the Commission has reservations. Post-merger moni-
toring may allow the Commission to address competitive con-
cerns without relying on its hypothesized theories to block
mergers.'14 This would increase efficiency in the short run by
conditionally approving mergers whose anticompetitive effects
could only materialize in the long run.195
187. Competition Act, supra note 184, § 102.
188. Id.; see also Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 21, at 591-92.
189. See Competition Act, supra note 184, § 102; Goldman & Bodrug, supra note
21, at 591-95.
190. See Competition Act, supra note 184, § 100; Goldman & Bodrug, supra note
21, at 595.
191. Competition Act, supra note 184, § 97; Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 21,
at 594-95.
192. Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 21, at 594-95.
193. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
194. See Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 21, at 594-95; supra notes 127-32 and
accompanying text.
195. Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 21, at 594-95.
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If the Commission, with the possibility of monitoring in
hand, clears more mergers than it otherwise would have, they
will encourage deals that may potentially increase global out-
put.196 This would remove some of the chilling effect on consoli-
dation that multijurisdictional review poses. 97 In the first
eleven years of the compliance system in Canada, no consum-
mated mergers were blocked after post-merger review. 19 This
indicates that the Bureau has been able to address concerns
adequately in the pre-merger stage. Therefore, the mergers
that Canada has subjected to post-closing review are unlikely to
have the anticompetitive effects anticipated pre-merger. If the
EU had similar procedures, the Commission would be able to
encourage synergistic mergers without subjecting consumers to
significant reductions in competition. 99
Aside from furthering uniformity, post-merger monitoring
would also allow Europe to continue to pursue distributive goals
through merger regulation. This is significant because many of
the hypothetical anticompetitive effects the Commission alleged
in, for example, GE-Honeywell and Air Liquide-BOC, would not
have materialized until long after closing."' If the merged GE
attempted to tie the purchase of Honeywell parts to GECAS fi-
nancing, or Air Liquide attempted to cross-subsidize predatory
pricing in the French market, Canadian-style monitoring would
allow the Commission to detect and remedy these problems
post-merger.2 01 In this way, post-merger review would provide
the EU with the "second shot" 202 necessary to evaluate antici-
pated anticompetitive behavior effectively.
Because the EC lacks private causes of action for antitrust
violations,"' post-merger monitoring provides an effective and
inexpensive means of ensuring that mega-mergers actually
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
198. See Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 21, at 620.
199. See generally supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (describing how
merger review has the potential to affect allocative efficiency and effectuate a na-
tion's domestic policy).
200. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
201. See Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 21, at 618-19 ("[Post-merger review]
may be an attractive alternative where possible anticompetitive effects of [a] merger
are uncertain. . . ."); supra note 99 and accompanying text (highlighting speculative
nature of these decisions).
202. Mario Monti has referred to the EC's merger regulation as a "one-shot pos-
sibility" for preventing anticompetitive effects from mergers. Shishkin, supra note
132, at A4.
203. EC Treaty, supra note 46, at arts. 81-82; Merger Regulation, supra note 55.
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benefit European consumers.2 °4 In the United States, treble
damages provide competitors with a strong incentive to chal-
205lenge anticompetitive practices that arise out of a merger.
This, combined with the ability of consumers to bring suit for
losses due to anticompetitive mergers, provides a check on the
behavior of newly joined companies. Post-merger monitoring
would provide a similar check for the EU and should not entail
efficiency losses greater than those borne by U.S. companies
that are targets of private post-merger antitrust actions.
F. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CANADIAN APPROACH
The Commission may however encounter some drawbacks if
it enacted post-merger review. Even proponents of the Cana-
dian system admit that if the Bureau chooses to monitor a
merged firm, the company may simply "behave itself' until the
period of monitoring is over.20 6 If this occurred, consumers in
the EU could be hit with the full anticompetitive effects of the
merger after the Commission had completed its observation.
The most serious potential problem with post-merger moni-
toring would stem from the inability of companies to integrate
fully if they fear that regulators may break them apart after
three years.2 7 Indeed, this was one of the concerns that
prompted Congress to adopt the Hart-Scott-Rodino reforms in
the first place.20  As Professor Fox aptly points out, the possibil-
ity of disintegration of the merger may also increase the social
costs of merger review.09 If companies became tenuous in the
face of Commission monitoring, their merger may not produce
all of its expected efficiencies.210 Furthermore, there may be dif-
ficulties in accurately evaluating competitive effects in a merged
company that is less than fully-integrated.211
Notwithstanding these potential concerns, the benefits of a
Canadian style system in the EU outweigh the costs. The
charge that merged firms will not reveal their true colors until
204. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
205. See generally supra notes 119, 123 and accompanying text. The Clayton
Act provides that most successful antitrust plaintiffs may recover three times their
actual injuries from a defendant's antitrust violation. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2002).
206. See Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 21, at 619.
207. Fox, supra note 167, at 731-32.
208. Id.; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
209. Fox, supra note 167, at 731-32.
210. See id. at 731-32.
211. See id. at 731-32; Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 21, at 619-20.
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after the Commission has completed the requisite monitoring
does not comport with the Canadian experience. 12  Further-
more, the threat of post-merger action may be only marginally
more ominous to business than the threat of U.S. treble damage
suits for anticompetitive behavior. If merged companies "be-
have themselves" and operate less efficiently under post-merger
review, the losses in productivity may be less drastic than Pro-
fessor Fox warns. If there were a loss in productivity, the bene-
fits of protecting the autonomy of EC competition policy and in-
creasing efficiency through a coordination of international
antitrust policy would outweigh any marginal losses to effi-
ciency.
CONCLUSION
U.S. and European competition policy and merger regula-
tions reflect the unique political and economic development of
each jurisdiction. Despite these different backgrounds, the
merger regulations of the U.S. and EC are remarkably similar
in substance. Because the greatest area of disagreement is over
substantive issues, for example the debate over the "portfolio ef-
fects" theory, reforms in the merger regulation itself are the
most promising to facilitate convergence. In fostering greater
convergence with U.S. regulations, the Commission should
make reforms in a way that allows it to protect European con-
sumers from the harmful competitive effects of some mergers.
Specifically, the Canadian approach of allowing post-merger
review of completed transactions may allow the Commission to
address competitive concerns without stifling synergistic merg-
ers. By implementing such a reform, the Commission would
promote the dual goals of maximizing global output while pro-
tecting its consumers from the harmful side effects of that
growth. The Commission would increase global efficiency if it
approved mergers with screening that it would otherwise have
rejected. A Canadian-style post-merger screening mechanism
would also protect consumers by guaranteeing that hypothe-
sized anticompetitive effects do not materialize. This reform
would allow the Commission to better serve the dual goals of
merger enforcement: efficiency maximization and consumer pro-
tection.
212. See Goldman & Bodrug, supra note 21, at 620-21.
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